LONDON/ISLAMABAD (The Thursday Times) — The Diplomat’s interview with Ajmal Sohail suffers from a basic evidentiary flaw: it presents incendiary allegations as though they were established findings. Pakistan’s late-February strikes into Afghanistan are documented, and China’s expanding economic interest in Afghanistan is real, but the article provides no credible independent evidence that Pakistan’s ISI is targeting Chinese interests there. No documents, intercepts, forensic tracing, or multi-source corroboration are offered, only the claims of one interviewee. That matters all the more because the thesis itself cuts against the publicly declared logic of Pakistan-China relations: Islamabad and Beijing have just reaffirmed their all-weather strategic partnership, deepened CPEC 2.0, and expanded cooperation in mining and connectivity. In that context, the burden of proof lies heavily on anyone alleging that Pakistan is sabotaging China. That burden has not been met.
The problem with this interview is not that it asks hard questions. The problem is that it collapses allegation into fact.
Ajmal Sohail should not be treated in this context as some wholly detached, neutral technocratic authority. Publicly available material describes him not only as a security or counterterrorism commentator, but also as an Afghan politician, including as the founder or leader of the Afghan Liberal Party. Older political-party listings and later profiles both place him in Afghan partisan politics, which means readers should approach his claims as those of a politically situated actor, not a disinterested referee.
The neutrality problem becomes even sharper when Ajmal Sohail’s own political record is taken into account. He is not merely a security commentator. In a 2013 interview with Mitvim, an Israeli foreign-policy institute, Sohail was introduced as the leader and founder of the Afghan Liberal Party, a parliamentary candidate, and an Afghan political figure seeking to develop ties with the Israeli public. In that same interview, he argued that Israel was “not an enemy,” said some Afghans viewed Israel as a potential ally, endorsed business and trade with Israel, and encouraged gradual cooperation in areas such as banking and mining. In other words, Sohail comes to these issues with a visible political worldview and foreign-policy orientation. His allegations against Pakistan, therefore, should be read as the claims of a politically situated actor, not as neutral expert findings.
When someone is simultaneously presented as an “intelligence analyst” or “counterterrorism expert” while also being a political figure with his own ideological and strategic positions, a publication should signal that clearly. Otherwise, political advocacy can be mistaken for neutral expertise.
There is also a second credibility issue: much of Ajmal Sohail’s public profile appears to come from self-description and affiliated platforms — his own website, his Substack, commentary pages, interviews, and secondary profiles repeating the same claims about his expertise and roles. Even the biographical material surfaced in search contains weak sourcing in places, including a “[citation needed]” marker on part of the Wikipedia description. That does not disqualify him from comment, but it absolutely means his allegations should be independently verified before being elevated into headline-level assertions.
Ajmal Sohail is not just an analyst; he is also a political actor. His views may be worth reporting as part of the debate, but they should be presented as the claims of a partisan Afghan political-security commentator, not as settled expert findings. Once that distinction is restored, the Diplomat piece looks much weaker, because its most explosive allegations rest heavily on the testimony of a figure who is plainly not neutral and whose claims, in this case, do not appear to be backed by publicly demonstrated evidence.
That distinction matters because some parts of the article rest on real events, while its central thesis does not appear to be similarly established. Pakistan did carry out cross-border strikes into Afghanistan in late February 2026 and said they targeted TTP and ISKP camps after deadly militant attacks inside Pakistan. Those strikes were widely reported. But that is a very different proposition from proving that Pakistan is covertly targeting China in Afghanistan. The article blurs that line.
The neutrality issue is central. A responsible interview on such a sensitive subject should have clearly signposted that these are the interviewee’s allegations, not verified findings. Instead, the headline itself effectively endorses the premise that Pakistan’s ISI is targeting the Chinese in Afghanistan. That framing gives a partisan or unverified narrative the appearance of settled fact.
There is also a basic logic problem the article never answers: why would Pakistan deliberately target China, its closest strategic partner?
Any claim that Pakistan would deliberately undermine Chinese interests in Afghanistan has to confront the basic reality of the Pakistan-China relationship. China is not a peripheral partner for Pakistan; it is its most important long-term strategic partner, repeatedly described by both sides as an “all-weather” or “iron-clad” relationship. In January 2026, Pakistan and China again reaffirmed that their partnership was a cornerstone of regional peace and stability, while Islamabad described the relationship as a cornerstone of its foreign policy. That is not the language of two states operating at cross-purposes.
That point became even sharper in the aftermath of the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. Within days of the ceasefire, Pakistan and China moved to deepen trade and investment ties, while Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi publicly backed efforts by Pakistan and India to achieve a lasting ceasefire through dialogue. Beijing’s public posture was one of support for stability, communication, and continued strategic engagement with Islamabad, not distrust of Pakistan or suspicion that Pakistan was sabotaging Chinese interests elsewhere in the region.
Even Indian allegations about Chinese assistance during the May conflict actually reinforce the wider point about strategic alignment. Reuters reported that an Indian army deputy chief alleged China had given Pakistan “live inputs” on key Indian positions during the fighting, an allegation Pakistan’s army chief later rejected as “irresponsible and factually incorrect.” Whether one accepts India’s version, Pakistan’s denial, or some position in between, the broader takeaway is the same: China was seen during that crisis as Pakistan’s closest strategic partner, not as a target of Pakistani covert hostility. The entire regional perception of that conflict rested on the understanding that Beijing and Islamabad remained closely aligned.
There is, then, a straightforward logic problem at the centre of the claim that Pakistan is targeting Chinese projects in Afghanistan. If Pakistan emerged from its most serious clash with India in years still leaning into Chinese diplomatic, economic, and strategic support, while both countries were reaffirming CPEC, closer coordination, and their all-weather partnership, the burden of proof on any claim that Islamabad is simultaneously sabotaging Chinese interests becomes extraordinarily high. Without hard evidence, that theory does not read as serious analysis; it reads as a politically loaded assertion that runs against the visible structure of Pakistan-China relations.
That is the opposite of a relationship Islamabad would rationally sabotage. If anything, Pakistan’s state interest is in protecting Chinese confidence, Chinese personnel, and Chinese capital. CPEC is not a peripheral file for Islamabad; it is one of the central pillars of Pakistan’s economic and strategic policy. The idea that Pakistan would intentionally attack Chinese interests in Afghanistan to “remind” Beijing of Pakistan’s relevance is not impossible in the abstract, but it is a highly consequential claim that demands extraordinary evidence. The article does not provide that evidence.
The article also ignores the obvious blowback risk. Any deliberate Pakistani role in undermining Chinese projects would damage trust with Beijing, weaken CPEC at a time when both sides are promoting its upgraded phase, and cut against Pakistan’s own repeated efforts to present itself as China’s most reliable regional partner. A theory that runs against the publicly declared interests of both states needs proof, not insinuation.
On the evidentiary standard, the weakest point is the alleged weapons consignment and the supposed plan to attack Chinese projects in the Wakhan Corridor. These details are presented with confidence, but the article does not show where the numbers came from, how the shipment was traced, who independently verified the route, or what proof links it to Pakistani agencies. Without that, readers are being asked to accept an extraordinary covert-operation narrative largely on the authority of one interviewee.
Pakistan and the Taliban are plainly in a period of intense hostility. Pakistan’s strikes into Afghanistan are real. China’s growing interest in Afghan connectivity and mining is real. Regional proxy politics are a legitimate area of concern. But none of that, by itself, proves that Pakistan is targeting China in Afghanistan. Until credible, independently verifiable evidence is produced, that claim remains an allegation, not an established fact.
