The law of contempt of court in India needs to be revisited

“In a democracy there is no need for judges to vindicate their authority or display pomp and majesty,” writes former Supreme Court of India Justice Markandey Katju.

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Chief Justice of India Surya Kant in judicial robes signing documents at Rashtrapati Bhavan
Chief Justice of India Surya Kant signs documents after taking the oath of office at Rashtrapati Bhavan in New Delhi on 24 November 2025. — Rashtrapati Bhavan via PTI
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The Supreme Court on Wednesday, 18 November 2026, issued notice on a petition filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association seeking initiation of contempt proceedings against a lawyer, Pravin Singhal, for allegedly making disparaging remarks about Chief Justice of India Justice Surya Kant in open court.

Do disparaging remarks against a judge in court amount to contempt of court? To answer this question, it is necessary to delve deep into the issue.

Where the law comes from

The present law of contempt of court in India is a hangover of the original law on this subject in England. This law originated from an undelivered judgment of Justice Wilmot in 1765, where the judge said the power of contempt of court was necessary to maintain the dignity and majesty of judges and vindicate their authority.

But whence comes this dignity, majesty and authority of judges? In England, in feudal times, it came from the king, who was the fountain of justice, and would often decide cases himself. Later, when he had many other duties, he delegated judicial functions to his delegates, who were called judges. Thus, in a monarchy, the judge really exercises the sovereign function of the king, which has been delegated to him by the latter, and for this he requires the dignity, authority and majesty which a king must have, to secure obedience.

In feudal times, the king was supreme, and the people were his subjects. They could not criticise him, and such criticism was punishable. The judges, who performed the delegated functions of the king, could also therefore not be criticised, since criticising them amounted to criticism of the king, and was therefore a crime.

A democracy reverses the order

In a democracy like India, however, this relationship is reversed. Now it is the people, not a king, who are supreme, and all state authorities, including judges, are nothing but their servants.

The Preamble to the Indian Constitution uses the words “We, the people of India,” and states that India is a democracy and a republic. This makes it clear that it is the Indian people who are supreme in India, not any state authority. It follows that the British law of contempt of court is obsolete, antiquated and outdated in independent India, but surprisingly it has been continued.

In a democracy there is no need for judges to vindicate their authority or display pomp and majesty. Their authority comes not from fear of contempt but from public confidence, and this in turn depends on their own conduct, integrity, impartiality and learning.

“Their authority comes not from fear of contempt but from public confidence.”

England has moved on

This view is accepted now even in England. As observed by Lord Salmon in AG vs BBC (1981) A.C. 303, “The description contempt of court no doubt has a historical basis, but it is nevertheless misleading. Its object is not to protect the dignity of the court, but to protect the administration of justice.”

“Justice is not a cloistered virtue,” said Lord Atkin. “It must suffer the scrutiny and outspoken comments of ordinary men.”

In R. vs Commissioner of Police (1968) 2 QB 150, Lord Denning observed: “Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction to uphold our own dignity. That must rest on surer foundations. Nor will we use it to suppress those who speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech itself. All that we ask is that those who criticize us should remember that, from the nature of our duties, we cannot reply to their criticism. We cannot enter into public controversy. We must rely on our conduct itself to be its own vindication.”

Sometimes an upright judge is unjustifiably criticised. The best course of action for such a judge is to ignore baseless criticism (but pay heed to honest and correct criticism). He should have broad enough shoulders to shrug off baseless comments without getting perturbed or influenced.

Once a British newspaper ran a banner headline calling the majority judges of the House of Lords who decided the Spycatcher case (Attorney General vs Guardian Newspaper, 1987, 3 All ER 316) “YOU FOOLS”. Fali Nariman, who was present in England at that time, asked Lord Templeman, who was one of the majority, why the judges did not take contempt action. Lord Templeman smiled, and said that judges in England took no notice of personal insults. Although he did not regard himself as a fool, others were entitled to their opinion.

In Balogh vs Crown Court at St Albans (1975) AC 373, the defendant told the judge, “You are a humourless automaton. Why don’t you self-destruct?” The judge smiled, but took no action.

India’s uncertain law

Now, coming to the law of contempt in India, we find it is uncertain. Nariman described it in a speech as “Dog’s Law”.

He quoted Bentham, who said that when a dog does something nasty we beat him for it. Similarly, the laws in England become known only when someone is punished by the courts. The same is true of the law of contempt in India, and thus it is a standing threat to freedom of speech.

To illustrate, in Duda’s case (AIR 1988 SC 1208), a Union cabinet minister said that the Supreme Court sympathised with zamindars and bank magnates. He further said, “FERA violators, bride burners, and a whole horde of reactionaries have found their haven in the Supreme Court,” and that Supreme Court judges have “unconcealed sympathy for the haves”. No action was taken against him. Nariman asked whether, if such a comment had been made by an ordinary man, the court would have taken no action.

Moreover, in an earlier decision, in the case of Namboodiripad (former chief minister of Kerala), who accused Supreme Court judges of being biased in favour of the rich, an allegation similar to that of the Union minister in Duda’s case, the court convicted Namboodiripad for contempt (AIR 1970 SC 2015). Where is the certainty or consistency in the law?

“Where is the certainty or consistency in the law?”

Reconciling two provisions

We have two provisions in our Constitution: Article 19(1)(a), which gives citizens freedom of speech, and Articles 129 and 215, which give the Supreme Court and the High Courts the power of contempt. How are these provisions to be reconciled?

In my opinion, since Article 19(1)(a) is the right of the people, who are supreme in a democracy, while Articles 129 and 215 are powers of judges, who are servants of the people, the reconciliation can only be done by holding that freedom of speech is primary, while the contempt power is only secondary.

It follows that the contempt power cannot be exercised because people are criticising a judge. It can only be exercised if someone makes the functioning of the judge impossible, for example if, while a judge is hearing a case, someone jumps on to the dais and tries to run away with the court file, or if he attacks or threatens a witness.

If someone calls a judge a fool inside the courtroom and goes away, in my opinion it is not contempt, for he has not stopped the functioning of the court.

“If someone calls a judge a fool inside the courtroom and goes away, in my opinion it is not contempt, for he has not stopped the functioning of the court.”

But if he keeps shouting in court the whole day, and despite warnings does not stop, he is obviously not letting the court function, and this would be contempt. After all, disputes in society have to be adjudicated, and judges must decide cases to justify payment of salaries to them.

Time to change

I submit that the time has come for Parliament, the judiciary and others concerned to take a fresh look at the law of contempt of court in the light of what I have said above, and bring about necessary amendments.

The great judge Jerome Frank, in his book Courts on Trial, said he had little patience with, or respect for, the view that it is dangerous to tell the public unpalatable truths about the judiciary.

He wrote: “I am unable to conceive that in a democracy, it can ever be unwise to acquaint the public with the truth about the workings of any branch of government. It is wholly undemocratic to treat the public as children who are unable to accept the inescapable shortcomings of man-made institutions… The best way to bring about the elimination of those shortcomings of our judicial system which are capable of being eliminated is to have all our citizens informed as to how that system now functions. It is a mistake, therefore, to try to establish and maintain, through ignorance, public esteem for our courts.”

I submit that the time has now come to reconsider and change the law of contempt of court, and make it accord with democracy. People should have the right to criticise judges, and if the criticism is unfounded, the remedy for the judge should be to file a suit for defamation.

Justice Markandey Katju

Justice Markandey Katju is a former judge of the Supreme Court of India, where he served from 2006 to 2011, and a former Chief Justice of the Delhi and Madras High Courts. He chaired the Press Council of India from 2011 to 2014 and writes widely on Indian society, politics and history.

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