Rethinking Musharraf

I grew up in a PML-N house where the general was the villain of every story. Fifteen years on, I've stopped believing it.

A leader can be all of that and still be the best this country has had in fifty years, because the bar, God help us, is where it is. — MICHAEL MCCALL FOR THE THURSDAY TIMES
A leader can be all of that and still be the best this country has had in fifty years, because the bar, God help us, is where it is. — MICHAEL MCCALL FOR THE THURSDAY TIMES

We heard a lot of bad things about Pervez Musharraf growing up.

I gained consciousness in the post-2008 era of Pakistani politics, when Asif Ali Zardari had become the nation’s president for the first time. We had heard, dimly, that Benazir was dead, and the name “Yusuf Raza Gilani” was ingrained in our minds from watching too much television.

The programmes on that television talked about this Musharraf figure as the man to blame for whatever calamity had befallen Pakistan lately. It is a strange thing to look back on, because the calamities were only getting started. The years that followed — the People’s Party’s years — were the years the bombs actually peaked. The worst bloodletting in the country’s recent memory happened on the watch of the people blaming him for it.

As a PML-N-supporting family, we reached adolescence on a steady diet of the injustices Musharraf had done to Nawaz Sharif. He caused Kargil. He caused martial law to be nafazed upon the Republic. He put an elected prime minister in a cell, then on a plane to Jeddah. The story had one villain, and we knew his name.

But was he really all that bad?

For the record, here is where I stand. I want a secular Pakistani state. I am a liberal, and a feminist to a certain degree. I think we should make peace with our neighbours on both sides of the border. I think the maulvis who have held a veto over Pakistani life since Zia should have it taken off them, permanently, and I have no patience left for the politicians who keep renewing it. I think, in other words, most of the things a Pakistani of my generation and my politics is supposed to think.

The trouble is that the man I was raised to despise spent the better part of a decade trying to do most of them.

Start with women. In 2006, over the walkouts and the howling of the religious parties, Musharraf signed the Women’s Protection Act, which took rape out of the Hudood Ordinances and put it back in the Penal Code — where a victim no longer needed four male witnesses to be believed, and no longer faced a charge of adultery if she couldn’t produce them. Two Benazir governments and two Nawaz governments had looked at those ordinances and left them exactly where Zia put them. Four years earlier, he had reserved one in six seats in the National Assembly for women. The democrats had the moral high ground for a decade and did nothing with it; the dictator did it with a signature.

The democrats had the moral high ground for a decade and did nothing with it; the dictator did it with a signature.

Women’s reserved seats in the National Assembly, before and after 2002

Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order tripled the number overnight.

Women’s reserved National Assembly seats: 20 before 2002, 60 from 2002 onward A bar chart with two bars. Before the 2002 Legal Framework Order, 20 seats were reserved for women. From 2002 onward, that rose to 60 seats. Before 2002 20 seats From 2002 (Musharraf’s LFO) 60 seats
Reserved seats for women in Pakistan’s National Assembly rose from around 20 to 60 — 17.5% of the house — under the 2002 Legal Framework Order. Figures as commonly reported by the Election Commission of Pakistan and independent election researchers.

Women’s reserved seats, national versus local government

The 2000 Devolution Plan went further at the local level than the 2002 reforms did in parliament.

Women’s reserved seats: 17.5% in the National Assembly, 33% in local councilsA bar chart with two bars. Women held 17.5% of reserved National Assembly seats under the 2002 Legal Framework Order. Under the 2000 Devolution Plan, women held 33% of local council seats.National Assembly (2002)17.5%Local councils (2000 Devolution Plan)33%
Roughly 36,000 women entered local government for the first time under the Devolution Plan’s 33% quota for union, tehsil and district councils — among the largest single entries of women into local politics anywhere at the time. Figures as reported in academic case studies of the 2000–2001 devolution reforms.

Then the neighbours. He went to Agra in 2001, was sent home with nothing, and kept trying anyway. He agreed a ceasefire on the Line of Control in 2003 that held for the best part of five years. He sat down with Vajpayee in Islamabad in 2004 and opened the composite dialogue, went to Delhi in 2005 to watch the cricket, and through the back channel got closer to a settlement on Kashmir than any Pakistani leader before or since. He sat with Karzai at a peace jirga in Kabul in 2007. His government had Radio Pakistan beaming across the borders in Persian, Dari and Hindi, and he stood in front of the cameras and told the people of India, directly, that Pakistan did not want war.

The whole train of thought started with a clip on Twitter the other day: Musharraf and George Bush walking up to a set of microphones, and Musharraf saying that Pakistani forces had entered the tribal areas for the first time in well over a century — that the British, in all their years on the frontier, had never managed it. What struck me wasn’t the claim. It was that he wasn’t performing. There were no votes in Waziristan. There was just a man who found the problem genuinely interesting and wanted a state that behaved like one — a state that could go anywhere it liked inside its own borders.

The country he ran was, for a few years, visibly changing shape. Growth ran north of six per cent for most of the middle of the decade. The mobile phone went from a rich man’s accessory to something a rickshaw driver kept in his breast pocket. The private television channels came into existence because he licensed them, and it tells you something about the man that the channels he created were the ones that eventually brought him down. A modern economy was being bolted onto a traditional one — unevenly, on a lot of consumer credit, with a fair amount of showing off — but it was being built, and you could watch it being built.

~7%Pakistan's average GDP growth for much of the mid-2000s under Musharraf — among the fastest-growing economies in Asia at the time.Source: Pakistan Ministry of Finance Economic Survey; State Bank of Pakistan annual reports

Mobile phone subscribers in Pakistan, 2000 to 2007

From a rich man’s accessory to a rickshaw driver’s breast pocket, in under a decade.

Mobile phone subscribers: about 1.7 million in 2000, about 77 million by the end of 2007A bar chart with two bars. Pakistan had around 1.7 million mobile phone subscribers in 2000. By the end of 2007, that had grown to around 77 million.2000~1.7 millionEnd of 2007~77m
Subscribers rose from roughly 1.7 million in 2000 to roughly 77 million by December 2007 — teledensity climbing from under 3% to more than 40%. Figures as reported by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority.
77Licensed private satellite and cable TV channels in Pakistan by the end of 2009 — up from zero before PEMRA was created in 2002.Source: Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA)

The Red Mosque I only heard about years after the fact, and I heard about it the way my family did: a massacre of students in the heart of the capital. Now I read what happened in the months before the siege. Clerics and their students had spent the first half of 2007 abducting police officers, kidnapping women they had decided were prostitutes, making bonfires of DVDs in the street, and announcing that a sharia court would sit in a mosque a few kilometres from the parliament. A state that lets that go on is not a state. Musharraf sent in the army. It was ugly, and many of the dead were very young. I would have sent it in too.

A state that lets that go on is not a state.

None of this makes him a democrat, and I am not going to pretend otherwise. He sacked a Chief Justice, and when that didn’t take, he sacked the rest of the judiciary along with him. He took the channels off air the moment they turned on him. Nawab Bugti died in a cave. People disappeared. The Imran Khan who would spend the next fifteen years selling himself as the only Pakistani who ever stood up to the establishment was, in November 2007, sitting in a cell under terrorism charges for trying to lead a student protest in Lahore — put there by the general, not the civilians. Kargil was his, and Kargil was a disaster. A leader can be all of that and still be the best this country has had in fifty years, because the bar, God help us, is where it is.

A leader can be all of that and still be the best this country has had in fifty years, because the bar, God help us, is where it is.

His decade, at a glance

2001The Agra summit with Vajpayee ends without a deal. He keeps trying anyway.
2002The Legal Framework Order reserves 60 National Assembly seats for women, up from around 20 before it.
2003A ceasefire on the Line of Control holds for the best part of five years.
2004He opens the composite dialogue with Vajpayee in Islamabad.
2005Cricket diplomacy in Delhi; back-channel talks edge closer to a Kashmir settlement than any Pakistani leader before or since.
2006The Women's Protection Act moves rape out of the Hudood Ordinances and into the Penal Code.
2007The Lal Masjid siege, the sacking of the judiciary, and Imran Khan's arrest under terrorism charges all happen within months of each other.
2008Musharraf resigns the presidency.
2022He dies in Dubai, still fighting amyloidosis.

I think Musharraf wanted to do most of the things I can only dream of a Pakistani leader wanting to do. I think I am slowly beginning to understand where he was coming from as I get older. I think he is one of the greatest leaders Pakistan has ever had.

I remember when word came, in the summer of 2022, that the amyloidosis he had been fighting for years was going to win, and his family did not expect him to recover. It was supposed to be a moment of joy for the nation: the zaalim was finally going to his maker to atone for his sins. A special court had already ruled, back in 2019, that if he died before he could be hanged, his corpse should be dragged to D-Chowk and strung up for three days. People on my timeline shared that paragraph approvingly. Atone for his sins.

What sins?∎

Abdullah Esquire

The author is a student of common law and politics in the EU.

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